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A Note on Mitigating the Adverse Scale Effects of Daily Driving Restrictions

1. Introduction
Episodic air pollution – in the form of elevated emissions of ozone precursors, carbon
monoxide, or particulate matter from mobile sources – is a recurrent problem in several US
cities, as well as in cities throughout the world.2 The problem has been pronounced enough
over time in the cities of Beijing, China and Mexico City, Mexico to provoke relatively drastic
actions on the part of their municipal governments, in particular the imposition of daily driving
restrictions aimed at reducing vehicle travel on a year-round basis. Initiated roughly 25 years
ago, Mexico City’s Hoy no Circula program prohibits households from driving vehicles on
assigned days of the week based on the last digit of each vehicle’s license plate number (e.g.,
digits zero and one prohibit driving the vehicle on Mondays, etc.), which translates into a
targeted 20 percent removal rate of vehicles on any given week day. Beijing’s program, initiated
just prior to the Olympic Games in 2008, has evolved from a roughly 70 percent removal rate to
the 20-percent-per-day target of Mexico City’s.3
Recent empirical studies suggest that neither city’s program has met expectations. For
example, Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) find that gasoline demand in Mexico City had actually
increased by seven percent by the time of their study. Davis (2008) also finds an increase in
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See Cropper et al. (2013), Cummings and Walker (2000), Henry and Gordon (2003), Jiang (2009), Cutter and
Neidell (2009), Carnovale and Gibson (2013), Wolff (2014), Gallego et al. (2013a, 2013b), and Osakwe (2010) for
examples of previous studies addressing this problem. In a more recent study of driving restrictions implemented
in Bogota, Colombia, Zhang et al. (2016) find that restrictions have differential effects on air pollutants because of
the pollutants’ heterogeneity in the atmospheric chemistry.
3
Beijing’s program is even more restrictive than this. Since 2011 Beijing authorities have rationed license plates
themselves, setting a quota on the number of plates issued per year (Guo, 2016; Zhai and Ying, 2016).
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gasoline consumption and, along with Gallego et al. (2013a and 2013b), reports an increase in
air pollution over the longer term as a result of households having responded by purchasing
additional (in most cases older and less-efficient) vehicles in order to “cheat” the daily
restrictions. Although the evidence for Beijing is mixed with respect to changes in the
concentrations of air pollutants (Wang et al., 2009; Wang et al. 2013; Viard and Fu, 2013; Chen
et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2014), the evidence for cheating is consistent with that of Mexico City’s
(Wang et al., 2013; Chen, 2012; Chen et al., 2013).
This note provides a theoretical underpinning for these empirical results, particularly with
respect to the cheating phenomenon described above. Here, we cast this phenomenon in more
economic terms by recognizing it as an “adverse scale effect”. We derive the necessary
condition for an adverse scale effect (ASE) at the household level and leverage this condition to
distinguish between ASE and non-ASE households. With respect to regulatory policy aimed at
mitigating the ASE, we find that although a vehicle registration tax indeed reduces the incentive
to purchase an additional vehicle among households whose sole purpose for doing so is to
cheat the restriction (i.e., among ASE households), it does so with an external cost. The cost
occurs because households whose purpose for purchasing an additional vehicle is not to cheat
the restriction (i.e., non-ASE households) are given the same disincentive as ASE households.
We show that one- and two-stage lotteries can be used to not only discriminate between ASE
and non-ASE households (in order to avoid providing a disincentive to the latter type of
household), but also to provide an even stronger disincentive to the former.
The literature on this particular aspect of the effects associated with a daily driving
restriction has thus far been mum. Zhang et al.’s (2016) behavioral model focusses primarily on
3

characterizing the extent to which households respond to a restriction by substituting vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) across days of the week, rather than on a household’s infra-marginal
decision of whether to purchase an additional vehicle. They show how the degree to which a
household substitutes VMT across restricted and unrestricted days impacts emissions; a
relationship we also explore in this paper. Unique to Zhang et al.’s (2016) model is a
characterization of the simultaneous effects of inter-day substitution on the emissions of
different types of pollutants.
Gallego et al. (2013a) adopt a bundling-model framework to explore the household’s inframarginal decision to purchase an additional vehicle or use public transport in response to a
driving restriction, which they consider a long-run response. They find that the cost of
purchasing and operating an additional vehicle and the extent to which the vehicle will be used
during peak and off-peak hours are the key factors in determining the long-run impacts of a
driving restriction on emissions. Their empirical analysis of Mexico’s Hoy no Circula program
suggests that because vehicles represent a “lumpy” or infra-marginal commodity, households
who purchased an additional vehicle shortly after implementation of the program were likely
close to having made that decision anyway, i.e., they were more likely non-ASE than ASE
households, a result that is consistent with our numerical results in Section 4.
The next section lays out a two-day model that characterizes the private benchmark
solution as well as the respective substitution effect and ASE that result from a daily driving
restriction policy (a more general specification of the model is presented in Appendix A). 4

4

The household’s private decision problem, rather than the social planner’s, is the natural benchmark for the
ensuing analysis, for reasons stemming from the paper’s underlying premise that the daily driving restriction is
predetermined, i.e., a fait accompli. We know that as long as the restriction is in place the household’s resulting
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Section 3 demonstrates how an annual vehicle registration tax levied on an additional vehicle
can be used to mitigate the ASE, and further demonstrates the tax’s limitation with respect to
its associated effect on non-ASE households. In this section we also propose two types of
lotteries that overcome this limitation. Section 4 presents a numerical analysis demonstrating
the theoretical implications of Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. Appendix
B presents the socially efficient solution for the general model presented in Appendix A and
demonstrates that a Pigovian tax is both household- and day-specific and can be adjusted for a
household’s purchase of additional vehicle(s).
2. A Two-Day Model of Daily Driving Restrictions
Adopting the example utility specification proposed in Appendix A, we assume the household’s
welfare function, 𝑢, is specified as,
𝑢 = 𝑀 + 𝛼& log 𝑣& +

+,
&-./

(1)

log (𝑣2 )

where 𝑣4 represents the household’s aggregate vehicle miles traveled (VMT) on days 𝑖 = 1,2, 𝛼4
are corresponding substitution parameters, and 𝑀 =

2
4:& 𝑚4

is aggregate income (numeraire

good) defined over the daily income equivalents 𝑚4 . Let the household’s daily-equivalent VMT
cost functions for days 1 and 2 be written as,
𝐶 𝑣4 = 𝑝𝑣4 + 0.5 𝑣42 + 𝐹4 , 𝑖 = 1,2

(2)

allocation of VMT will generally be socially inefficient as a result of both substitution and scale effects associated
with households cheating the restrictions through the purchase of additional vehicles. The pertinent issue that we
address here is not the extent to which the household’s allocation is socially inefficient, but rather which policies
might work best in mitigating the scale effect.
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where 𝑝 represents the household’s gas price per VMT and 𝐹4 represents the daily-equivalent
fixed cost of VMT (comprised inter alia of vehicle registration fees and insurance premiums).
The household’s two-day-equivalent budget constraint is then represented as,
𝐼 = 𝑀 + 𝑝 𝑣& + 𝑣2 + 0.5 𝑣&2 + 𝑣22 + 𝐹& + 𝐹2 .

(3)

Lastly, aggregate emissions for the two days is written as,
𝐸 = 𝑒 𝑣& + 𝑣2 .

(4)

The household’s private, two-day decision problem can be written as,
𝜔E =

𝑀𝑎𝑥
+
𝑀 + 𝛼& log 𝑣& + , log 𝑣2 .
&-./
𝑣& , 𝑣2

(P1)

Substituting (3) for 𝑀 in (P1) and differentiating results in optimality conditions,
+/
./

−

+,
log
&-./ ,

+,
&-./ .,

(5a)

𝑣2 − 𝑝 − 𝑣& = 0

(5b)

− 𝑝 − 𝑣2 = 0.

For future reference let 𝑣4E , 𝑖 = 1,2 represent the household’s optimal VMT under private
decision making for days 1 and 2.
Assuming its VMT is restricted on day 1 under the daily driving restriction program, i.e.,
𝑣& → 0, the household’s decision problem is effectively reduced to,
𝜔J =

𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑀 + 𝛼2 log 𝑣2
𝑣2

(P2)

subject to,
𝐼 = 𝑀 + 𝑝𝑣2 + 0.5 𝑣22 + 𝐹& + 𝐹2

(3’)

resulting in optimality condition,
+,
.,

(6)

− 𝑝 − 𝑣2 = 0

and, solving (6), optimal 𝑣2J .
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Comparing equations (5b) with (6) we note that 𝑣2J > 𝑣2E for any 𝑣&E > 0, i.e., the household
exhibits a “positive substitution effect” on day 2 as a result of the driving restriction placed on
day 1. To see this, rewrite these two equations as,
+,
.,
+,
.,

= 𝑝 + 𝑣2 1 + 𝑣&

(5b’)

= 𝑝 + 𝑣2 .

(6’)

Now note that when the 𝑣2E solving (5b’) is substituted to (6’) we obtain

+,
.,

> 𝑝 + 𝑣2 , which

implies that 𝑣2 must increase to bring equality, in turn implying 𝑣2J > 𝑣2E .
In addition to this substitution effect, a household exhibits an ASE when, as described in
Section 1, the household purchases an additional vehicle solely for the purpose of
circumventing its daily driving restriction, i.e., solely for the purpose of being able to drive on
what would otherwise be a restricted day of the week. In this way, the ASE household “cheats”
its restriction once the restriction is imposed. To the contrary, a non-ASE household purchases
an additional vehicle for reasons other than to circumvent its daily driving restriction, i.e., not
to cheat its restriction once the restriction is imposed. For example, the motive for a non-ASE
household’s purchase would purely be to provide a newly licensed family member with access
to an additional vehicle, irrespective of which days of the week that vehicle is permitted to be
driven a priori. 5
Here, we derive the necessary condition for a household to exhibit an ASE. In doing so, we
ultimately define an ASE household’s “expected net infra-marginal benefit” associated with the

5

We obviously abstract from reality here, as some households could purchase an additional vehicle to “partially
cheat” the restriction, i.e., to sometimes circumvent the restriction and sometimes not. Allowing for partial
cheating in the context of this model would unnecessarily complicate the ensuing analysis.
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purchase of an additional vehicle, both in the absence and presence of additional regulation. By
“additional regulation” we mean regulation in addition to the daily driving restriction that has
been imposed a priori, e.g., the levying of a registration tax or lottery jointly with the driving
restriction. As we will see, the necessary condition depends upon the ASE household’s expected
net infra-marginal benefit because from the ASE household’s perspective the assumed
uncertainty about how and whether the purchase of the additional vehicle will ultimately
permit it to circumvent the daily driving restriction is unresolved at time of purchase.
Uncertainty in this case pertains not only to the chance that the license plate number assigned
by the regulator to the additional vehicle will ultimately preclude the household from driving on
what is currently already a restricted day of the week, but also to the way in which the
household will incorporate the additional vehicle into its fleet. Maintenance of this type of
uncertainty in the ‘mind’ of the household is central to the ensuing analysis of lotteries as
potential mechanisms to mitigate the ASE.
Letting 𝐸 𝜔E represent the expected value of 𝜔E as defined in problem (P1) inclusive of
operating an additional vehicle, the necessary condition for an ASE household to purchase an
additional vehicle in the absence of additional regulation (undiscounted for simplicity) is,
𝐸 𝜔E − 𝐴 + 𝐹 M ≥ 𝜔J

(7)

or,
Ω = 𝐸 𝜔E − 𝜔J − 𝐴 + 𝐹 M ≥ 0.

(7’)

where (i) 𝐴 is the (two-day equivalent) one-time purchase price of the additional vehicle, and
(ii) 𝐹 M is the household’s (two-day equivalent) total fixed cost associated with the additional
vehicle.
8

As (7) makes clear, in the absence of additional regulation an ASE household ultimately
compares its restricted welfare, 𝜔J , with the expected value of circumventing the driving
restriction, 𝐸 𝜔E , net of the additional vehicle’s purchase price and associated fixed costs. The
expectation operator on 𝜔E reflects the fact that an ASE household ultimately envisions being
successful in cheating the driving restriction, albeit with the uncertainty associated with having
to incorporate the operation of an additional vehicle into its fleet in the process of effectively
re-solving its private decision problem (P1). Equation (7) therefore represents a standard
comparison between the household’s expected net benefit associated with successfully
cheating the driving restriction versus the certain net benefit obtained from choosing to
continue abiding by the restriction.
Equation (7’) expresses this necessary condition in terms of what we call the ASE
household’s expected net infra-marginal benefit. It then naturally follows that the ASE
household’s expected net infra-marginal benefit from purchasing an additional vehicle in the
presence of additional regulation can be defined as Ψ Ω , where Ψ: Ω ⟶ ℝ represents a
household-specific regulatory mapping function. The necessary condition for a household to
exhibit an ASE in the absence(presence) of additional regulation is can therefore be expressed
most succinctly as Ω ≥ 0(Ψ Ω ≥ 0). In other words, if a household exhibits an ASE, whether in
the absence or presence of additional regulation, then its expected net infra-marginal benefit
from purchasing an additional vehicle must be non-negative.6 Further, since additional

6

If the ASE household perceives low-enough transaction costs (𝑇 U ), e.g., with respect to the time and effort
necessary to calculate its Ω or Ψ Ω , whichever the case may be as well as locate and purchase an additional
vehicle, then the necessary condition for a household to exhibit an ASE also defines the sufficient condition for the
household to exhibit an ASE. In this case it is sufficient for an ASE to exist whenever Ω − 𝑇 U ≥
0 or Ψ Ω − 𝑇 U ≥ 0 .
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regulation in the presence of an existing daily driving restriction is presumed to impose
additional cost on a household, Ω > Ψ Ω .
Before turning to the discussion of regulatory schemes that might be used to mitigate a
household’s ASE, we appeal to the definitions above in order to formally distinguish ASE from
non-ASE households.7 This distinction draws upon the fact that although a non-ASE household
bases its decision of whether to purchase an additional vehicle upon the same cost portion of
Ω, i.e., the value of 𝐴 + 𝐹 M , it does not base its decision on the same benefit portion, i.e.,
𝐸 𝜔E − 𝜔J . Rather, the non-ASE household’s benefit from the additional vehicle is derived
solely from the added benefits the household expects to enjoy from that point forward in a
post-restriction state of the world as a result of having incorporated the additional vehicle into
its existing vehicle fleet.
Specifically, the non-ASE household’s net infra-marginal benefit from purchasing an
additional vehicle in the absence of additional regulation is defined as Ω = 𝐸 𝜔J − 𝐴 + 𝐹 M ,
where in this case the expectation operator on 𝜔J reflects the uncertainty associated with
having to incorporate the operation of an additional vehicle into its fleet in the process of
effectively re-solving its restricted decision problem (P2). Similar to an ASE household, the nonASE household’s net infra-marginal benefit in the presence of additional regulation is then
defined as Ψ Ω . Thus, an ASE household bases its decision on whether to purchase an
additional vehicle upon the value of Ω (absent additional regulation) or Ψ Ω (in the presence

7

It is important to note that because the regulator is precluded from distinguishing ASE from non-ASE households
ex ante as well as ex post, the regulator is consequently precluded from designing a socially efficient solution to
this problem. Therefore, the best a regulator can do is to reduce the incentive any household may have to impose
an ASE on society at large.
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of additional regulation), while a non-ASE household bases its decision upon Ω or Ψ Ω ,
respectively.
We now turn to an analysis of the potential impacts of an “additional regulation” as
described above, in particular the impacts of a lump-sum registration tax levied by an
imperfectly informed regulator, where by “imperfectly informed” we mean that the regulator is
uninformed about a given household’s Ω or Ω, whichever the case may be. Thus, the regulator
is uninformed about the household’s status as a potentially ASE or non-ASE household.
3. Vehicle Tax and Lotteries
Levying an annual vehicle registration tax, 𝑇 J , on an ASE-household’s additional vehicle causes
its associated regulatory mapping function to be specified as
Ψ Ω = 𝐸 𝜔E − 𝜔J − 𝐴 + 𝐹 M + 𝑇 J .
Clearly,

cd e
cf g

(8)

< 0, implying that the registration tax can be used by the regulator to reduce a

household’s ASE.8 However, the regulator is confronted with two problems in using the annual
tax, stemming from both its imperfect information about household type and the fact that the
regulatory mapping function for a non-ASE household results in

8

cd e
cf g

< 0 as well.9

Fullerton and West (2002) find that a vehicle registration tax based on mileage (i.e., annual odometer readings)
can mimic a first-best emissions tax under the assumption of identical or non-identical consumers. Registration
taxes based vehicle characteristics are shown to be second-best. Innes (1996) shows that an imperfectly informed
regulator’s optimal emissions control policy includes joint fuel content standards, fuel taxes, and vehicle
registration taxes tied to the mileage the regulator anticipates will be driven per vehicle. In a dynamic context,
periodic registration taxes are shown to be efficient. Giblin and McNabola (2009) find that vehicle registration
taxes in Ireland based upon expected CO2 emissions could result in a roughly 4% reduction in the emissions over
time. Vehicle registration taxes across Europe vary significantly (Kunert and Kuhfeld, 2007), as they do in the US
(NCSL, 2016). Several other studies assess the efficacy of vehicle registration taxes in controlling environmental
externalities (Ajanovic et al., 2016; Liu and Cirillo, 2015; Feng et al., 2013; Hennessy and Tol, 2011; Mabit and
Fosgerau, 2011; Fullerton and West, 2010; Barter, 2005; West, 2004).
9
This is because 𝑇 J also appears negatively in the expression for Ψ Ω .
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First, because it is uninformed about the household’s Ω value, the best the regulator can
hope to achieve with an annual registration tax is a reduction in the probability of a given ASE
household’s potential ASE, rather than its ASE per se. Figure 1 depicts a case where the
regulator is cognizant of the probability density function associated with a given ASE
household’s Ω (assumed normal for sake of example – initially mean-zero). Here, 𝑇 J > 0
induces a leftward shift of the ASE household’s density function and a corresponding decrease
in the density corresponding to Ω ≥ 0 equal to area A.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Second, as a result of the regulator’s concomitant inability to distinguish ASE from non-ASE
households, the annual registration tax is, by definition, levied indiscriminately across these
two types of households. Therefore, because

cd e
cf g

< 0, the tax also induces a leftward shift of

the non-ASE household’s density function, resulting in a decrease in the density corresponding
to Ω ≥ 0 depicted by area A as well. Recall from Section 1 that reducing a non-ASE household’s
incentive to purchase an additional vehicle should be neither a regulatory goal nor casualty, as
these types of households are not expressly attempting to “cheat” the daily driving restriction.
As we now show, one way to solve this second problem is to implement one of a number of
possible simple or compound lotteries in conjunction with the annual registration tax.10 Here
we describe two such lotteries. By investigating the role that lotteries might play in reducing
the inefficiency associated with an annual vehicle registration tax, we admittedly eschew the
obvious possibility that the regulatory authority might instead implement a fully-informed,

10

For any lottery to work in mitigating an ASE, households must be required to register their additional vehicles
prior to the lottery’s implementation.
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targeted license-plate numbering scheme, whereby the numbers of each of the household’s
existing license plates are taken into consideration by the regulator (e.g., through access to a
database of existing vehicle registrations) before issuing the license plate to the household for
its additional vehicle. In this way, the regulator would be able to eliminate the ASE without
relying on chance. While true, we proceed with the presumption that a targeted, commandand-control approach of this type is considered to be draconian, unfair, or politically
unacceptable.11 Although not market-based regulation per se, the lottery, as conceived in this
instance, is instead “chance-based” and “eminently fair”, similar to how lotteries are often used
to ration charter school admissions and wilderness recreation access in the US (Kerr, 1995).12
Imposing a lottery 𝐿 on an ASE household causes the household’s associated regulatory
mapping function to be specified as,
(8)

Ψ Ω = Ω|𝐿

11

This said, used car markets in certain Latin American cities enable households searching for second-hand
additional vehicles to effectively circumvent their driving restrictions by selecting the license plate numbers along
with the vehicles (Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2014). This is potentially a significant factor in undermining the longer-term
effects of daily driving restriction regulations on local air pollution since the import of relatively dirty used vehicles
from outside a restricted area is likewise a common occurrence (Gallego et al., 2013a, 2013b). As our paper makes
clear, the extent to which vehicle owners are able to choose their plate numbers affects the extent to which an
ASE is mitigated. If vehicle owners are permitted to choose their plate numbers deterministically, plate assignment
will no longer serve as an effective instrument for mitigating the ASE. Alternatively stated, the uncertainty
associated with drivers being precluded from determining their vehicle’s plate number (e.g., as a result of a lottery)
is crucial for mitigation of the ASE.
12
The license plate allocation system in Bejing provides another interesting case. Regulators there periodically
alter the assignment of daily driving restrictions (eBejing.com, 2015). However, the restrictions are announced to
drivers well in advance of taking effect – they occur on a pre-set 13-week rotating basis and are implemented
solely for traffic management purposes. The announcements therefore do not incorporate an element of
uncertainty and therefore do not mimic a lottery. Granted, if the announcements did occur on a random basis then
they would indeed mimic the lotteries that we describe in the paper. But it would seem that the costs associated
with this type of surprise (e.g., drivers would be forced to respond with unplanned adjustments to their
transportation decisions) outweighs the benefit of mitigating the ASE (presumably drivers would temper their
preference for an additional vehicle with the fore-knowledge that assignment of plate numbers will be randomized
post-purchase). A negative net benefit is thus the likely reason why periodic alterations to the assignment of digits
to days in these cities are not randomized.
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where the expression Ω|𝐿 denotes that the ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal
benefit from purchasing an additional vehicle is now explicitly conditioned on a specific 𝐿,
which, as we show below, again implies Ω > Ψ Ω .
To the contrary, a non-ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal benefit from
purchasing an additional vehicle is not conditioned on 𝐿, reflecting the fact that the motive for
a non-ASE household’s purchase is not to circumvent the driving restriction and thus its
purchase decision is independent of which days of the week that vehicle is permitted to be
driven. Therefore, a lottery has no effect on a non-ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal
benefit, which implies Ψ Ω = Ω.
Perhaps the simplest type of lottery to consider is a “single-stage”, or simple lottery Lll ,
whereby numbers ending in zero and one restrict the vehicle on Mondays, two and three
restrict on Tuesdays, etc. If the regulator were to randomly assign license plate numbers
according to this particular method and, for sake of example, the household’s VMT is currently
restricted solely on Monday of each week, then over the course of a five-day week the
household would have an 80 percent chance of receiving a plate number that permits it to drive
the additional vehicle on Mondays. In this case, the effect of Lll , which we denote as on the
expected infra-marginal benefit of a risk-averse ASE household, is Ψ Ω = 0.8Ω < Ω.
Graphically speaking, the lottery induces a leftward shift of the ASE household’s density
function (as in Figure 1), but not in a non-ASE household’s.
A second type of lottery, henceforth denoted as “two-stage”, or compound lottery Lnl , is
capable of inducing a larger decrease in the ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal
benefit, while again having no effect on that of a non-ASE household. In the first stage of Lnl ,
14

prior to a household’s actual purchase of the additional vehicle, the regulator flips a fair coin. If
the coin turns up heads, the household is assured of being issued a license plate for the
additional vehicle whose last digit matches that of a current vehicle in its fleet. For example, if a
household currently has two vehicles with license plate numbers ending in 1 and 4 (thus
restricting one vehicle on Mondays and the other on Wednesdays), the plate number for the
additional vehicle is assured of ending in either 1 or 4 as well. Therefore, for households that
are unlucky enough to have gotten a heads on the first flip of the coin, the lottery is finished.
Households that were lucky enough to have gotten a tails on the first flip of the coin then
move onto the second stage of Lnl , where the regulator again flips a fair coin prior to a
household’s actual purchase of the additional vehicle. If the coin comes up heads, the
household is again assured of being issued a license plate for the additional vehicle whose last
digit matches that of a current vehicle in its fleet. If the coin comes up tails, the regulator
instead randomly selects the household’s license plate number, just as was done using lottery
Lll . In the end, therefore, the effect of Lnl on the expected net infra-marginal benefit of a riskaverse ASE household is now Ψ Ω = 0.2Ω < Ω, which represents a far larger leftward shift of
the risk-averse ASE household’s density function than that depicted in Figure 1 for lottery Lll .13
Two implications of this two-stage lottery bear mention. First, getting a heads in either the
first- or second-stage coin flip requires the regulator to use information about a household’s
existing vehicle-registration information in what – as mentioned above – may be considered a
draconian or politically unpalatable way before issuing the license plate to the household for its

13

Because the coin flips are independent events, the household’s 50 percent chance on the first flip, 50 percent
chance on the second flip, and then the 80 percent chance in the final round of the lottery translates into a
reduction factor on the risk-averse ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal benefit of 20 percent.
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additional vehicle. Second, the extent to which a given lottery mimics the fully-informed,
targeted license-plate numbering scheme depends directly upon the randomizing mechanism
used. For example, if the regulator uses a roll of a die rather than a flip of a coin to determine
the probability that a given household advances through the second stage of the lottery to the
final, random selection of its license plate number, the household’s chance of advancing that
far in the process could be greatly diminished. In the limit, the regulator can effectively
implement a degenerate lottery, where the probability that the ASE household is able to
circumvent its driving restriction is zero. But then the question of political acceptability of such
a lottery looms large.
4. Numerical Analysis
To demonstrate the two-day model’s implications described in Sections 2 and 3, we appeal to
numerical analysis.14 Parameter values for this analysis are listed in Table 1 and solution values
for the private and restricted models are presented in Table 2.15
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
From Table 2 we first note that, as expected, 𝑣2J > 𝑣2E . Further, 𝑣&E + 𝑣2E > 𝑣&J + 𝑣2J ⇒
𝐸 E > 𝐸 J , which indicates that the driving-restriction regulation is “effective”. For simplicity,
and without loss of generality, we henceforth assume that 𝜔E = 𝐸 𝜔E and 𝜔J = 𝐸 𝜔J .
Using the corresponding values in Tables 1 and 2, and again assuming a one-year time horizon
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We use GAMS v. 23.8.2 x86_64/MS Windows for this numerical exercise.
Recall that parameters 𝑝 and 𝐹4 , 𝑖 = 1,2 represent per-VMT gas price and daily-equivalent fixed costs; hence
their relatively low values for this analysis. Because our numerical example is solely for illustrative purposes we
make no claim that the parameter values, and hence solution values, are representative of any particular realworld case. It is interesting to note that for this particular numerical exercise 𝛼& ≈ 5.54 is the threshold below
which 𝑣&E = 0, i.e., where the optimal solution is at the corner for day 1. We have chosen 𝛼& = 7 in our analysis
merely for convenience.
15

16

for simplicity, the household’s Ω-value reduces to 1.30 − A , where again A represents the
one-time, two-day equivalent purchase price of the additional vehicle. Hence, the household
satisfies the necessary condition for being an ASE household in the absence of additional
regulation for any A ≤ 1.30.16 In the presence of additional regulation the threshold value for A
is reduced according to the regulatory mapping function Ψ: Ω ⟶ ℝ described in Section 3.
For example, suppose the additional regulation is an annual vehicle registration tax set
equal to 0.05. In this case Ψ Ω reduces to 1.25 − A and the necessary condition for being an
ASE household in the presence of the tax is now satisfied for any A ≤ 1.25. Further, Ω > Ψ Ω
also holds for any A. By way of comparison, a similarly risk-averse non-ASE household’s Ω and
Ψ Ω values equal 102.83 − A and 102.78 − A , respectively, and therefore Ω > Ψ Ω as
well for any A. Taken together, these results demonstrate one of the key results of Section 3,
namely that an annual vehicle registration tax indiscriminately reduces the incentives of both
ASE and non-ASE households to purchase an additional vehicle, in particular both Ω ≥ Ψ Ω
and Ω ≥ Ψ Ω in the presence of the tax. They also lend some support to Gallego et al.’s
(2013a) hypothesis mentioned in Section 1 that in response to the implementation of Mexico
City’s Hoy no Circula program households purchasing additional vehicles were likely close to
having made the purchase regardless, i.e., they were behaving more like the non-ASE
households described in this paper. This is because the non-ASE’s upper-bound purchase price
for an additional vehicle (102.83) is so much larger than that for the ASE household (1.30).

16

Recall that our numerical example is purely for illustrative purposes. Thus any solution value, such as the
threshold value for A in this case, should be considered relative in size to the parameter values chosen for the
analysis. Also, recall that all variable values are in daily or two-day equivalents, whichever the case may be.
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The main result of Section 3 is also now evident. If the household is an ASE household, then
because lottery 𝐿 reduces the household’s Ω-value we again obtain Ω > Ψ Ω . For example,
suppose lottery Lll is adopted by the regulatory authority. Then Ω = 1.30 − A > Ψ Ω =
0.8 1.30 − A . For lottery Lnl , Ω = 1.30 − A > Ψ Ω = 0.2 1.30 − A . Interestingly, the
lotteries do not reduce the threshold level of A, as occurs with a registration tax. As described
in Section 3, because the non-ASE household’s expected net infra-marginal benefit is
independent of the lottery, Ψ Ω = Ω = 102.83 − A .
5. Summary and Conclusions
Daily driving restrictions, although currently a popular form of regulation used to control
episodic air pollution problems worldwide, is nevertheless a second-best approach. Both the
substitution and adverse scale effects derived and characterized in this paper attest to the
inherent shortcomings of this type of restriction. In addition to characterizing these effects, this
paper investigates the efficacy of two forms of regulation – vehicle registration taxes and
lotteries – in mitigating the scale effect when the regulator has incomplete information about
the households it is tasked to regulate.
We find that although a vehicle registration tax indeed reduces the incentive to purchase
additional vehicles among households whose sole purpose for doing so is to “cheat” the
restriction (which we have named an “adverse scale effect”), it does so with an external cost.
The cost occurs because households whose purpose for purchasing an additional vehicle is not
to cheat the restriction are given the same disincentive with a registration tax. We show that
one- and two-stage lotteries can be used to not only discriminate between cheater and noncheater households, but also to provide an even stronger disincentive to the former.
18

Clearly, no single policy (barring a household- and day-specific Pigovian tax as derived in
Appendix B) is capable of controlling episodic pollution at its socially efficient level. Thus, in a
practical sense, multiple policy instruments are likely necessary – perhaps quantity regulations
such as daily driving restrictions – accompanied by vehicle registration taxes and lotteries to
mitigate accompanying scale effects – and VMT or perhaps gas taxes to control for substitution
effects. At the very least, it helps to know the limitations associated with a given instrument.
This paper has brought to light the fundamental limitations of a registration tax in the presence
of daily driving restrictions, and demonstrated how a policy as simple as flipping a coin can be
used to address them.
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Appendix A – Generalized Model of the Adverse Scale Effect
Following Zhang et al. (2016), let 𝑣4v represent household 𝑖’s total vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
– based on the use of all vehicles in its fleet – on weekday j = 1,...,5, of week w = 1,...,52, in year
y (subscripts w and y will henceforth distinguish variables solely when necessary), and vector
𝑣4 = 𝑣4& , … , 𝑣4x represent 𝑖’s associated schedule of daily VMT per week.17 Assuming quasilinear preferences, 𝑖’s weekly utility function is expressed as 𝑈4 =

v 𝑚4v

+ 𝐵4 𝑣4 , 𝑖 =

1, … , 𝑁, where 𝑚4v and 𝐵4 𝑣4 are 𝑖’s daily-equivalent numeraire and weekly benefit from VMT,
respectively. We adopt standard curvature conditions for 𝐵4 𝑣4 :
well as

c , |} .}
c.}~ c.}•

≤ 0, 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 and

example, 𝐵4 𝑣4 =

+}~
v &-.
},~ƒ/

c , |} .}
c.}~ c.}•

c|} .}
c.}~

> 0,

c , |} .}
c.}~ ,

≤ 0, as

< 0 for at least one 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. For

log 𝑣4v , 𝛼4v > 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑣4,v…& = 0 for 𝑗 = 1 would be one

possible specification for 𝐵4 𝑣4 , in which case the marginal utility of VMT on any given day is
weighted according to the VMT of the preceding day, with the weight assigned to VMT on day 1
(e.g., Monday) normalized to 𝛼4v .
The two latter conditions on function 𝐵4 𝑣4 imply that when 𝑖’s VMT is reduced on a given
day 𝑘 due to an existing driving restriction on that day, the marginal value associated with its
VMT on any other given (unrestricted) day 𝑗 of the week does not decrease, and it increases for
at least one day 𝑗, all else equal. This condition reflects the fact that household 𝑖 may
potentially adjust its VMT on any given day 𝑗 in order to accomplish what the reduced amount

17

In concert with the actual programs mentioned in Section 1, we assume that driving restrictions are imposed
solely during the weekdays, i.e., Monday through Friday.
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of VMT on day 𝑘 would have otherwise accomplished that day, thus making VMT on day 𝑗 more
valuable.18
‡

Let 𝐶4 𝑣4v = 𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝐹4v represent 𝑖’s daily-equivalent VMT cost function, where
‡

(1) 𝑐4 indicates 𝑖’s gas price per VMT (determined jointly by the prevailing price per gallon and
some measure of the overall fuel efficiency of 𝑖’s vehicle fleet), (2) 𝐹4v = 𝐹4ˆ ∀𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5
represents 𝑖’s daily-equivalent fixed cost of VMT, and (3) 𝑐4 𝑣4v is 𝑖’s daily-equivalent variable
cost of VMT (including depreciation, maintenance expenses, etc., associated with the
household’s vehicle fleet), with standard curvature conditions

cU} .}~
c.}~

> 0 and

Household 𝑖’s weekly budget constraint can therefore be written as 𝐼4 =

v

c , U} .}~
c.}~ ,

≥ 0.

𝑚4v + 𝐶4 𝑣4v

where 𝐼4 represents 𝑖’s constant weekly-equivalent income level. Lastly, let 𝐸v =

4 𝑒4 𝑣4v

,

be the

community’s aggregate daily emissions, where 𝑒4 represents 𝑖’s per-mile emissions factor,
which is based upon the type of vehicles in 𝑖’s fleet and 𝑖’s driving habits.19
Household 𝑖’s private, daily decision problem for any given week can therefore be
expressed as,

18

The household may choose to respond to a restriction on any given day of any given week in a myriad of ways.
For instance, the household may choose to increase its VMT on a set of unrestricted days rather than just one day,
or perhaps decrease its VMT on one unrestricted day (e.g., by taking public transport or eliminating a trip
altogether) and compensate by increasing its VMT even more on another day. Our cross-partial condition on
𝐵4 𝑣4 , i.e.,

c , |} .}

c.}~ c.}•

≤ 0, does not preclude any such set of responses. It merely states that the marginal value of

VMT on any given unrestricted day has increased in response to the imposition of a restriction on any other given
day. What ultimately determines a household’s optimal response on a weekly basis are therefore the relative
values associated with changes in daily VMT. Indeed, it may be optimal for a household to decrease its VMT on an
unrestricted day even though the marginal value of VMT on that particular day has increased. This is because the
increases in the marginal values of VMT on all of the other unrestricted days exceed that day’s by large enough
margins.
19
In a more disaggregated framework, 𝑒4 might be a weighted average across the types of vehicles in household 𝑖’s
fleet as well as its driving habits for each vehicle.
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𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝜔4E = 𝑣 𝐵4 𝑣4 −
4v

v

‡

𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝐹4v

resulting in first-order conditions,20
c|} .}
c.}~

‡

− 𝑐4 −

cU} .}~
c.}~

≤0

𝑣4v

c|} .}
c.}~

‡

− 𝑐4 −

cU} .}~
c.}~

= 0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗

(A1)

which indicates that in its benchmark private decision problem, household 𝑖 will optimally
choose its 𝑣4v up to the point where the daily private marginal benefit of VMT is no greater than
E
its corresponding marginal cost for any given week. Henceforth, let 𝑣4v
and 𝐸vE represent the

optimal private levels of daily household VMT and aggregate emissions, respectively, 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5.
Assume household 𝑖 is assigned certain day(s) of the week, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑗 ∗ , where its VMT is
restricted. Without loss of generality, we assume this restriction is set such that 𝑣4v ∗ = 0, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑗 ∗ ,
i.e., the household is precluded from driving on days 𝑗 ∈ 𝑗 ∗ . Given this restriction, household 𝑖’s
daily decision problem on unrestricted days of the week for any given week may be expressed
as,
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝜔4J = 𝑣 𝐵4 𝑣4 −
4v

v

‡

𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝐹4v , 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗 ∗

where, for example, 𝑣4 = 𝑣4& , 𝑣42 , 0, 𝑣4Œ , 0 indicates that VMT restrictions are in effect on days
3 and 5 of each week for household 𝑖. The resulting first-order conditions for unrestricted days
are written as,
c|} .}
c.}~

‡

− 𝑐4 −

cU} .}~
c.}~

= 0, 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗 ∗

(A2)
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We note that the curvature conditions on 𝐵4 𝑣4 and 𝑐𝑖 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ensure that sufficient second-order conditions for
this and all ensuing decision problems are satisfied.
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J
Henceforth, let 𝑣4v
and 𝐸vJ represent the optimal levels of daily household VMT and aggregate

emissions, respectively, for the daily driving restriction problem. It is now readily apparent that
in the presence of a daily driving restriction, household 𝑖 exhibits a positive “substitution effect”
J
E
on at least one of the unrestricted driving days, whereby 𝑣4v
> 𝑣4v
for that day (or days) 𝑗 ∉

𝑗 ∗ .21
In other words, the daily driving restriction induces a positive substitution effect on at least
one unrestricted day of the week, whereby household 𝑖 compensates for not being permitted
to drive on day(s) 𝑗 ∈ 𝑗 ∗ by driving no less on that unrestricted day 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗 ∗ (relative to what it
otherwise would have driven on that day in the absence of the daily driving restriction). If the
driving restriction program is ultimately effective for household 𝑖 – in the sense that it results in
J
v 𝑣4v

<

E
v 𝑣4v ,

which states that household 𝑖 drives less on a weekly basis in the presence of a

daily driving restriction – then the substitution effect alone is not strong enough to completely
offset the restriction’s effect on household 𝑖’s total weekly VMT. This would imply
4

E
v 𝑣4v

4

J
v 𝑣4v

<

on a community-wide basis if the driving restriction program is effective enough for a

requisite number of households, in which case 𝐸vJ ⋛ 𝐸vE for any 𝑗 = 1, … ,5 (because on any
J
given day 𝑣4v
= 0 for some subgroup of households). However, 𝐸ŽJ =

direct result of

21

4

J
v∉v ∗ 𝑣4v

<

4

J
v 𝐸v

c|} .}
c.}~

≥

c|} .}
c.}~

E
v 𝐸v

as a

E
v 𝑣4v .

For those readers requiring a formal proof of this result, first apply curvature condition

𝑗 ∗ and note that

< 𝐸ŽE =

c , |} ∙
c.}~ c.}•

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗∗, 𝑘 ∈

for each day 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗 ∗ , i.e., in the presence of a daily driving restriction, the marginal

value of VMT on any given non-restricted day does not fall relative to its marginal value in the absence of a daily
driving restriction. Next, apply curvature conditions

c , |} ∙
c.}~ ,

c, U} .}~
c , |} .}
≥ 0, as well as the condition
c.}~ ,
c.}~ c.}•
E
𝑣4v
for that day (or days) 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗 ∗ .

≤ 0 and

J
0 for at least one 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘., Equations (A1) and (A2) then imply 𝑣4v
>
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<

E
Similar to the two-day version of the model in the text, letting 𝐸 𝜔4vŽ
represent the

expected value of (the daily-per-week version of) 𝜔4E as defined above inclusive of operating an
additional vehicle, an ASE household 𝑖’s expected net infra-marginal benefit from purchasing
the additional vehicle in the absence of additional regulation is Ω4 =
‘…&
’
‘:& 𝛽4

Ž

v

E
J
𝐸 𝜔4vŽ
− 𝜔4vŽ

‘…&
’
‘:& 𝛽4

− 𝐴4 +

Ž

M
v 𝐹4vŽ

, where (1) 𝛽4 =

&
&-“

represents the household’s discount factor based on discount rate 𝑟 for finite number of years
J
𝑦 = 1, … , 𝑌, (2) 𝜔4vŽ
is the household’s optimal net benefit obtained from its restricted

decision problem prior to imposition of the driving restriction (derived in Section 3), (3) 𝐴4 is the
M
one-time purchase price of the additional vehicle, and (4) 𝐹4vŽ
is the household’s daily-

equivalent fixed cost associated with the additional vehicle.
An ASE household 𝑖’s expected net infra-marginal benefit from purchasing an additional
vehicle in the presence of additional regulation is then defined as Ψ4 Ω4 , where Ψ4 : Ω4 ⟶ ℝ
represents a household-specific regulatory mapping function. The necessary condition for a
household to exhibit an ASE in the absence(presence) of additional regulation is Ω4 ≥
0(Ψ4 Ω4 ≥ 0). Further, since additional regulation in the presence of an existing daily driving
restriction is presumed to impose additional cost on a household, Ω4 > Ψ4 Ω4 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁.
Similar to the discussion in Section 2, a non-ASE household 𝑖’s net infra-marginal benefit from
purchasing an additional vehicle in the absence of additional regulation is Ω4 =
‘…&
’
‘:& 𝛽4

Ž

v𝐸

J
𝜔4vŽ

− 𝐴4 +

‘…&
’
‘:& 𝛽4

Ž

M
v 𝐹4vŽ

. Further, the non-ASE

household’s net infra-marginal benefit from purchasing an additional vehicle in the presence of
additional regulation is defined as Ψ4 Ω4 .
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Levying an annual vehicle registration tax, 𝑇‘J , on ASE household 𝑖 causes its associated
regulatory mapping function to be specified as Ψ4 Ω4 =
J
𝜔4vŽ

− A— +

™…&
™:& β—

œ

•
› F—›œ

+ T™Ÿ

‘…&
’
‘:& 𝛽4

Ž

v

E
𝐸 𝜔4vŽ
−

and the results discussed in Section 3 hold in this

more general specification as well. Similarly for the single- and two-stage lotteries described in
Section 3.
Appendix B – The Social Efficiency Benchmark
Recalling that 𝐸v =

represents the community’s aggregate daily emissions, where 𝑒4

4 𝑒4 𝑣4v

represents 𝑖’s per-mile emissions factor, let the community’s total daily damage function
associated with 𝐸v be represented by 𝐷v = 𝐷 𝐸v , with

c¢ £~
c£~

> 0 and

c , ¢ £~
c£~ ,

≥ 0. Given 𝐷v ,

the socially efficient benchmark solution is determined via the benevolent social planner’s
problem,
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑊= 𝑣
4v 4

4 𝐵4

𝑣4 −

4

v

‡

𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝑐4 𝑣4v + 𝐹4v −

v𝐷

𝐸v

resulting in the first-order efficiency conditions,
c|} .}
c.}~

‡

− 𝑐4 −

cU} .}~
c.}~

− 𝑒4

c¢ £~
c£~

= 0, ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗

(B1)

which indicates that in the socially efficient solution household 𝑖 will choose its 𝑣4v up to the
point where the private marginal benefit of VMT is equated with its social marginal cost on a
daily basis for any given week. Social marginal cost is in turn divided between its private cost,
‡

𝑐4 +

cU} .}~
c.}~

, and external cost, 𝑒4

c¢ £~
c£~

, components.

∗
Denoting 𝑣4v
and 𝐸v∗ , respectively, as the socially efficient levels of daily household VMT and

aggregate emissions associated with (B1), and comparing equation (B1) with equation (A1), we
25

E
∗
see that 𝑣4v
> 𝑣4v
and thus 𝐸vE > 𝐸v∗ , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,5. Comparing these two

equations also indicates that a household- and day-specific Pigovian tax levied on the
household’s daily emissions level, 𝑒4 𝑣4v , would need to be set at the rate,
∗
𝑡4v
= 𝑒4

c¢ £~∗
c£~

.

(B2)

∗
Note that because 𝑡4v
is levied directly on the household’s daily emissions level, it is adjusted

for the purchase of an additional vehicle solely via a corresponding revision to the household’s
𝑒4 value as the vehicle is incorporated into the household’s fleet.
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Figure 1. Effect of annual vehicle registration tax on probability of adverse scale effect.
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Table 1. Parameter values.
Parameter
𝐼
𝛼&
𝛼2
𝑝
𝐹&
𝐹2
𝐹M
𝑒

Value
100
7
5
0.00005
0.005
0.005
0.005
1
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Table 2. Results.
Variable
𝑣&E
𝑣2E
𝑣&J
𝑣2J
𝐸E
𝐸J
𝜔E = 𝐸 𝜔E
𝜔J = 𝐸 𝜔J
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Value
2.62
1.18
0
2.24
3.80
2.24
102.83
101.53

